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ABSTRACT  
 
Public open space (POS) is central to the environment, and oftentimes spatial and 
architectural designs are emphasised in urban planning as part of creating quality POS. 
However, such initial design and planning of POS may not adequately encapsulate the 
sustainability dimensions of the complex social-ecological behavioural patterns of POS 
consumption and management, hence resulting in space mismanagement, 
underinvestment, and quality degradation. This phenomenon is particularly true and 
relevant in the context of government/state-owned POS. Therefore, an objective of 
this perspective paper, coupled with the concepts of the publicness levels, is to provide 
a different understanding of exclusivity and subtractibility natures of POS, primarily 
using the theory of common pool resources (CPRs), which subsequently helps explain 
and rationalise the perennial, adversarial POS management, quality and sustainability 
status quo. This paper reveals that, instead of being considered as pure public goods, 
scarce POS owns two inherent attributes of CPR, namely non-excludable and 
subtractive (rivalrous) that are ultimately susceptible to social/commons dilemmas, 
covering the Tragedy of the commons (overexploitation), management shirking, free-
riding, underuse, disuse, and moral hazard, which lead to degraded, unsustainable 
POS. The commons or CPR theory can indeed offer a new paradigm shift, making 
urban planners and landscape managers to embrace that the unexclusive natures of 
CPR-based POS are truly finite and depletable and thus vulnerable to POS dilemmas. 
Hence, to achieve quality, sustainable POS commons, effective governance in terms of 
consumption and consistent management is vital. For future research, urban design as a 
necessary societal role is suggested, which has established the need for effective 
allocation of POS management via an adaptive institutional property rights design. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Local governments are mandated, through the collection of 
taxes, to provide and manage various public/civic goods, which 
are essential to serve as a public purpose, and one of them is 
public open spaces (POS) (Tiebout, 1956). POS can be defined 
in wide arrays of definitions, categories, and functions (types of 
activities and facilities), e.g., recreational park, sidewalk, 
playground, green space, community garden, semi-active space: 
basketball court, promenade, revitalised brownfield land, active 
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and passive spaces (Onwuayi & Ndinwa, 2017; Ling and Pung, 
2019). In recent years, research on equitable, sustainable 
management and provision of POS has grown tremendously as it 
has evidently rendered various ecosystem services and portrayed 
significant roles in achieving sustainability and the quality of life, 
mainly contributing to the 11th and the 12th Sustainable 
Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda. 
 
There are many studies undertaken on the protection and 
preservation of POS quality and sustainability, encompassing 
perception and socioeconomic features: attitudes (preferences) 
of stakeholders towards POS protection (Broussard et al., 2008; 
Maruani and Amit-Cohen, 2011), public participation in 
planning policy (Steelman and Hess, 2009), spatial and 
architectural POS design and planning models (Maruani and 
Amit-Cohen, 2007; Colding et al., 2013), and “conventional” 
state planning policies with edict (Koomen et al., 2008) and 
critical planning policy implementation and enforcement 
(Bengston et al., 2004). However, the issues of notably state-
owned POS quality with respect to over-exploitation, misuse, 
underinvestment, and mismanagement, including vandalism 
(broken POS facilities), graffiti, inaccessible spaces, exclusion, 
illegal land and space (POS) conversion (e.g., to commercial 
spaces), insecure and unsafe spaces, cleanliness, congestion, 
poor landscaping and squatters settlement encroachment issues, 
are growing and prevalent, especially in developing countries of 
Southeast Asia including Malaysia, thereby causing POS negative 
externalities and market failures (World Bank, 2015; Ling et al., 
2016, 2018; Foster and Laione, 2016; Ling and Leng, 2018). 
Thus, a question is posed, i.e., why are POS issues still rampant 
and occurring, despite the above research undertaken? 
 
The posed problems of such domestic Tieboutian modelled or 
government-owned POS are closely associated with governance, 
consumption and management issues (i.e., post-design stage), 
rather than ab initio design-based issues. Many urban and rural 
POS in terms of its spatiality (e.g., location, shape, and size) and 
architecture have been strategically planned at the beginning of 
the design stage, and the provision of facilities and amenities is 
sufficient, which overall give quality, inviting spaces. However, 
such good condition and quality of scarce POS may not sustain 
due to asymmetric and heterogeneous consumption and 
management behaviour issues of individuals (Poklembovai et al., 
2013; Ling et al., 2016). That is the following questions should 
be identified and reflected on: What will happen after the spatial 
and architectural design stage of POS? Is there any efficient 
enforcement and mechanism used to govern the space, 
particularly on its consumption and management? Certainly, the 
design stage (pre-condition) is important as part of provisioning 
good quality of POS, but what makes POS quality sustained? 
This post-design and planning issue is more critical and 
imperative as this involves long-term and complex social-
ecological process and interaction, which are often uncertain 
and conflicting in nature. As Poklembovai et al., (2013) 
asserted, “Successful physical spaces are dependent on the 
performance and legitimacy of spatial management processes 
and practices… Planning and implementation are the initial 
phases, but public spaces are continually co-created by their 
users.”. As such, to answer the above questions, a 
transdisciplinary approach is necessary. 
 
Methodologically, the institutional-social-ecological system by 
Ostrom (2009), the theory of commons or common pool 
resources (CPRs) (Ostrom, 1990), and the concepts of social 
dilemmas (Kollock, 1998) and negative externalities were 
reviewed and adopted in this perspective paper as analytical 
frameworks to shed light on the current POS governance issues. 
By looking into the natures of publicness (exclusivity) and 
rivalrousness (subtractibility/contestability) of POS, the 
objective of this paper is to establish causal mechanisms, linking 
types of economic goods (CPR), governance (consumption and 
management), with resources quality and sustainability 
outcomes. In other words, this study can be of significance and 
practical because it essentially showcases how the above CPR 
theory and its associated concepts (social dilemmas and the 
social-ecological system) explain and rationalise the status quo of 
perennial, adversarial POS management and quality issues. 
More precisely, the main arguments and findings suggested at 
the end of this study are that via the unexclusive and rivalrous 
CPR natures discovered in POS with different publicness levels 
such spaces are argued to be prone to various commons 
dilemmas and negative externalities. The above theoretical 
underpinning (via political-microeconomic perspective) by 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom was chosen because it has proven 
to be robust and influential in addressing the above POS 
negative externalities, which are related to consumption and 
management issues. Based on the literature review, it is, 
however, found that human-nature (POS) interaction issues to 
be analysed within the lens of the social-ecological framework 
have been considerably overlooked in the planning theory (see 
Elmqvist, 2014; Lai, 2014).  
 
More precisely, the knowledge and application of the commons 
or CPR in the context POS planning and management (called 
new commons) are still limited (Colding et al., 2013; Nagendra 
and Ostrom, 2014; Brown, 2015; Foster and Laione, 2016; 
Ling et al., 2016; Ling and Leng, 2018). Although the literature 
on natural resources (old) commons and CPRs (e.g., agriculture 
and fishery) is copious, it remains a challenge to transpose CPR 
insights into the urban and neighbourhood-residential resources 
context in a way that captures the complexity of the urban-
neighbourhood, the way that density of an land area, the 
proximity of its inhabitants, and the diversity of users interact 
with a host of tangible and intangible resources in 
neighbourhood-city areas (see Borch and Kornberger, 2015). As 
such, there is a need to diversify the current mainstream 
environmental planning system; it is crucial to embrace the idea 
of ‘planning POS with commons in mind’.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: (i) 
Commons/CPR in the POS context, in which, aside from the 
definitions of POS and conceptualisation of CPR in POS, the 
typology of economic goods is also employed to explain 
differences among the goods; (ii) The publicness (sharedness) 
and exclusivity concepts of POS (i.e., public realm versus public 
domain versus local public goods); (iii) Implications of CPR-
based POS using the social-ecological system and social 
dilemmas perspectives; and lastly (iv) Conclusion consisting of 
lessons learnt from the institutional-economic field in POS 
planning, and of future recommendations. 
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2. Public Open Space (POS) as a 
Commons/CPR 
 
First, we need to define what ‘commons’ is. The concept of 
commons is multidisciplinary as it attracts various scholars from 
different schools of thought (especially economists, property 
theorists, and commons theorists), whom have diverse 
definitions and understanding of commons. The term commons 
can either be deemed or interpreted as common-property 
resources (as a property right regime that belongs to one 
group/community, specifically- known as common property 
regime) or common resources (as a resource domain/system) 
(Hess and Ostrom, 2006). However, it seems that the latter is 
more widely accepted and applied even by institutionalists and 
property theorists in their scholarly works. As asserted by 
Bromley (1992), “…there is no such thing as a common 
property resources…”.  
 
Thus, commons are a general term that refer to the resources 
shared (collectively consumed) by a group of people, in which 
each of them has equal interest. Campbell and Wiesen (2009, p. 
11) stated that commons are “publically accessible, 
nonexcludable, and managed through shared governance”. In a 
simpler word, commons are a shared resources system (Hess 
and Ostrom, 2006), or they are a “shared heritage of us all” 
(Hess, 2008), governed by any form of a property rights 
regime/system (Ostrom, 2002). Once again Ostrom’s 
argument has drawn a clear, distinctive line between a resource 
system and a resource (property) regime. This is vital and worth 
noted because some confusion and misconception occurred over 
the sharedness (publicness) of commons, which can be 
discovered in the notable illustration of the seminal theory 
“Tragedy of the Commons” which erroneously considered 
commons as total ungoverned, unrestricted, open-access grazing 
land (as a type of property regime), rather than a resource 
system (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975).  
 
Thus, since POS is a collectively consumed resource, it is 
conceptualised as a commons, more specifically, as an urban 
commons or neighbourhood (hometown) commons, depending 
on the settings, which both are part of new commons (Hess, 
2008). Such neighbourhood commons or urban commons 
encompass various civic spaces, including playground, streets, 
recreation areas, parking space, community parks, gardens, 
urban public spaces, streets, public roads, recreation areas, 
football field and basketball court, etc. (Colding et al., 2013), 
and they can be regarded as POS. Thus, the two terms (POS and 
commons) are used interchangeably in the paper.  
 
Most of the collectively consumed goods (e.g., forests, roads, 
pastures, air, river, and sea) are scarce goods, like POS in this 
context. Based on the typology of goods theory (Ostrom and 
Ostrom, 1977; see Webster, 2007) (Table 1), the majority of 
natural resources/commons including POS can be categorised as 
common-pool resources (CPR), instead of fictitious pure public 
goods (e.g., non-rivalrous and non-excludable lighthouse and 
fireworks- see Webster, 2002 on existence value). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Excludability and Rivalry Levels of Four Different 
Economic Goods 
 
 
Source: Gluck (2000) 
 
With different types of goods, including pure public goods, club 
goods, and private goods, and their respective examples, the 
above table provides clearer understanding on the notions and 
levels of subtractibility (rivalry) and excludability characteristics 
of CPRs. As Nobel Laureate Lin Ostrom posited, regardless of 
the property rights structure, a CPR is frequently denoted as a 
resource domain, featuring two inherent attributes, namely 
excludability — the obstacle of restricting (regulating), whether 
physically or institutionally, individuals from accessing and using 
resource units from the resource; and subtractibility — once an 
individual harvested the profit (benefits and enjoyment) of 
resources, they are not useable anymore by other users 
(Ostrom, 2005). Although Table 1 shows that a recreational 
facility and national parks are entrepreneurial club goods (with 
low-cost exclusion and low rivalry), due to the payment system 
resulting in exclusion, such POS goods can also transition into 
CPRs, owing to institutional (property-rights) and spatial factors 
which are partly discussed in the next section (see Webster, 
2002; Webster’s 2007 on the transition fluidity of economic 
goods). Regardless, focusing on the CPRs system and 
conceptualising the concept of the CPR within a complex social-
POS system, it entails that CPR-based POS requires high cost 
and is difficult to exclude or control users (either residents or 
non-residents/non-citizens) from accessing and consuming POS 
and its units, including POS conditions and quality that involve 
the availability of POS facilities and amenities, functionality, 
landscape, and cleanliness and safety and security of POS 
surrounding. Secondly, such scarce POS units in terms of 
quality and quantity/provision can be fugitive and are 
diminishable, because once POS conditions are not well-
maintained or overused by an individual, and its provision is not 
replenished, only poor POS quality (e.g., cleanliness and safety 
issues) and unusable POS facilities (e.g., unavailable basketball 
court and loss of POS) are available to others (see more in social 
dilemmas in the later section). 
 
 
3. ‘Publicness’ of POS: Public Domain, 
Public Realm and Local Public Goods 
 
Since the non-excludable attribute of CPR- or commons-based 
POS is synonymous with the general concept of 
publicness/sharedness, it would be helpful for this paper to 
deconstruct and theorise about the vague and unspecified 
concept of unexclusiveness (publicness) of urban and 
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neighbourhood commons/CPR, using Webster’s (2002) 
theoretical literature of public domain, public realm, and local 
public goods. By providing the definitions and importance of 
each publicness concept below, in this paper, we explain how 
those economic publicness concepts are interrelated, and how 
they are conceptualised into the urban and neighbourhood 
commons (POS) planning context. Such publicness analysis is 
indeed essential because, without the identification of publicness 
forms and levels, one cannot accurately distinguish to what 
extent, and what form of, the publicness (unexcludability) of the 
CPR-based POS is. Different publicness levels and forms may, 
in essence, and arguably lead to different rivalrousness or 
congestion levels of POS (Webster, 2002; Webster, 2007), 
which may consequently contribute to different implications on 
the behavioural consumption patterns of users, and may 
therefore account for and result in the aforesaid CPR-POS 
quality issues (Colding et al., 2013; Ling et al., 2016). Having 
said this, we, however, have not attempted to causatively and 
precisely determine which publicness of commons will always 
have greater contestability and rivalrousness, nor have we 
identified which publicness level is more prone to, or ensues in, 
severe overuse and other commons dilemmas. In light of the 
above, we did, however, provide evidence and arguments to the 
claims on the interrelationships between CPR publicness levels 
and vulnerability of commons dilemmas in more indicative and 
deductive manners. Regardless, what is more important is that 
the effort of identifying the forms and levels of publicness is 
consistent with Colding’s et al., (2013) position that it is 
erroneously fallacious and deceptive always to equate commons 
or CPR with open public space.  
 
Public domain is, as defined by property theorists and 
economists, “…a sphere of resource consumption within which 
consumption rights remain unallocated” (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973; Barzel, 1997). See also Allen (2002) that public domain is 
equivalent to having open access to the resource. Webster 
(2002), similarly, in his own words, maintains that public 
domain is “Attributes to which rights are not assigned by formal 
or informal contract are said to be in the public domain, and are 
potentially the subject of competition. The public domain is 
therefore the domain (spatial or otherwise defined) within 
which competition occurs in the consumption of 
attributes…Because it is too costly to establish property rights 
over every attribute of a good, some will inevitably be left in the 
public domain.” Webster continues by implying that public-
domain POS means the rights to consume a benefit of the POS 
are unassigned, whereby a general public (or outsiders/non-
contributing users/non-citizen) may have access to it. See Ling 
et a., 2016 for Sabah’s public-domain POS that even Filipinos as 
a non-citizen can have access to the urban park, as transaction 
costs for rights assignation and enforcement are high. In the 
absence of allocated use rights, more resources entailing high 
transaction costs (e.g., monitoring and physical barricade) are 
required to protect and manage scarce public-domain POS, and 
this is assumed to be inefficient because POS is likely to be 
degraded and its dissipation costs (e.g., queuing, conflict, 
adopting an inconvenient trip manner, and inaccessible POS) are 
accruing to no one. 
While, public realm is a “spatial domain within which de facto 
or de jure economic or legal consumption rights over a local 
public good attribute are shared by all individuals within a 
city…there exists a group of consumers-noncitizens-to whom 
property rights over the public good attribute are denied” 
(Webster, 2002). Similar to public domain, although public-
realm POS facilities (e.g., sidewalks, benches, green spaces, and 
pavements) consumption right is assigned to specific groups of 
individuals within a city or a neighbourhood, within the very 
same groups of consumers, they usually cannot prevent the 
inclusion and seclusion issue; thus, such public commons are 
also subject to rampant competition. As such, to control public 
realm and public domain overcrowding issue, they exclude 
other individuals using a rationing approach, i.e., by costs, the 
money or time costs of travel, or by congestion (itself a form of 
cost) (Webster, 2007). Except for few urban/civic POS located 
in a city centre, which may cater uniform benefits of facilities 
and services to a large number of urban folks, most spaces give 
greater levels of enjoyment (use) and access to those living 
nearer. This type of resources is similar to the case of Tieboutian 
local public goods, such as urban parks for some city dwellers 
and neighbourhood community parks in housing estates. The 
neighbourhood and urban commons are considered as the 
resources with distance-attenuated attributes and benefits; such 
POS provides greater levels of enjoyment and consumption to 
those residents living closer. In respect of a congestion issue, 
since Tieboutian local neighbourhood POS access and use, 
espousing local planning standards, are only catered to a 
community who lives nearby the neighbourhood, the provision 
(supply of space quantity), in principle, is sufficient, unless the 
particular local community park is unique compared to other 
local parks that attract other neighbourhood residents to use and 
over-occupy it, which then creates a congestion (overuse) issue.  
 
From the publicness definitions, there are interrelationships 
among the ‘publics’. Most of state-owned CPR resources like 
urban spaces, street walk, and public parks are considered public 
domain (unassigned consumption right), from the property 
rights perspective, but due to the cost of spatial extent involving 
distance, travelling, congestion (a form of exclusion), only 
certain individuals have greater access to the resources, such 
public-domain space is a form of local public goods to them. 
This entails that local public goods can always co-exist and are 
benefitting certain groups of users with closer proximity. 
Similarly, due to distance and travelling costs (proximity), the 
local POS with the distance-attenuated attributes are found in a 
public realm. The public-domain POS (e.g., community park, 
neighbourhood playground, and urban park) is de facto 
fragmented/transitioned into public-realm local goods, when 
the economic use right is assigned by distance and is reinforced 
by informal institutions (e.g., practice within a community). 
Also, it is worth noted that a public realm may de facto become 
a public domain, once the assigned consumption right of the 
former is not enforced effectively. 
 
To sum, the publicness concepts of CPR-POS are various and 
are considered as a continuum (i.e., public domain may 
transition into public realm and vice versa) (Webster, 2002), 
due to the spatial concern and institutional factors (rights 
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assignation and rights enforcement). Also, due to 
spatial/distance factors and exclusion costs, spaces either within 
public domain or public realm are considered as local public 
goods to some users who are closer to them. It appears that a 
public-domain space may exert a greater congestion level facing 
severe resource degradation compared to local public goods in 
public realm as the former is subject to a larger population and 
therefore greater competition among them for quality POS 
facilities and amenities (Webster 2002, 2007). However, this 
assumption is served as instrumental for the quantity aspect of 
POS provision or level of contestability measurement, instead of 
POS quality and individuals’ consumption behaviour, and the 
claim by Webster may not always be generalisable and true in 
reality, if some circumstances are met. In Webster’s (2002) 
study, he argued that public-domain spaces (e.g., on-street 
parking space as local public goods) can be efficient, so long as it 
is below the congestion level (i.e., consumption demand for 
POS is lower than supply).  
 
Moreover, despite consumption right assignation for public-
realm space and the distance-attenuated benefits of a local 
neighbourhood park, since both are having a difficulty in 
excluding other individuals’ use, both spaces are also vulnerable 
to a certain extent of congestion and degradation (quality) 
(Webster, 2007; Foster and Laione, 2016; Ling et al., 2016). 
More interestingly, according to Ling’s, (2017) finding, local 
residential community parks (public realm-local public good) 
are more prone to congestion and other forms of quality 
degradation, compared to public-domain civic spaces in the city 
centre. Irrespective of any levels and forms of publicness of 
urban and neighbourhood commons (be it public-realm or 
public-domain local POS), it is discovered that those ‘publics’, 
to certain extent, are subject to their respective issues of 
congestion (undersupply of POS and its units in terms of its 
quantity) and other negative externalities. The questions of 
vulnerability/susceptibility and the severity of congestion, 
competition and other forms of negative externalities among 
public realm, public goods, and public domain still remain 
inadequately answered, using only the publicness analysis above.  
 
That is, aside from POS congestion issues that can be well-
explained by the publicness levels of CPR (i.e., more of quantity 
provision rather than quality aspect of POS), to offer more 
holistic analysis and explain better the above POS quality (post-
design) issues (e.g., vandalism, illegal conversion, broken 
facilities and amenities, and poor cleanliness), one should look 
into the publicness issues of commons, based on a case-by-case 
basis. We argue that those issues are fundamentally boiled down 
to CPR rivalrous/depletable and non-exclusionary (publicness) 
attributes, which are associated with a selfish and opportunistic 
behaviour within a social-ecological interaction.  Hence, we 
employ the social dilemmas theory below to explicate the CPR 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Social Dilemmas and Negative 
Externalities  of  CPR-POS 
 
Within a complex, large social-POS system, involving multiple 
interests and stakeholders (e.g., local authority, land officers, 
and residents/users) and conflicting decision making, it is 
challenging and difficult to govern and manage the shared 
commons (i.e., CPR-POS). Rested on the neoclassical 
economic premises and theories of self-interestedness 
(rationality maximisation), opportunism (Williamson, 2002) 
and social dilemmas, we showcase what are possible commons 
dilemmas involved in the CPR-POS context, and how CPR-
POS is vulnerable to numerous social (commons) dilemmas and 
negative externalities (i.e., how selfish and opportunistic 
individuals are depicted in a social-POS system). Prior to the 
detailed discussion of the above questions, the definitions and 
background of self-interest, opportunism and social dilemmas 
are provided foremost.  
 
Self-interest (selfishness), a sole intention of human behaviour 
from an economic lens, refers to individuals who inevitably 
behave rationally to maximise their advantages (welfare and 
utility). This concept is relevant to a social-ecological system, 
where defective self-interested individuals may cause 
unrestrained pollution and commons degradation (Musole, 
2009). Building on the self-interest concept, opportunism 
provides more accurate understanding with respect to social-
ecological behaviour and their decision-making (Williamson, 
1975). As Williamson averred, opportunism entails “…self-
interest seeking with guile…”, in which opportunistic 
individuals (residents or POS users) tend to pursue their 
personal interests, whereas breaking their covenant (promises), 
e.g., neglecting their POS management and maintenance duties 
and attempting to go against the policies/regulations of POS via 
vandalism and illegal land use change.  
 
There is a connection between social dilemmas and self-interest 
based opportunism; the former (self-interestedness and 
opportunism) are inherent in social dilemmas (latter). A social 
dilemma is an interdependent decision-making situation where 
“individually reasonable behaviour leads to a situation in which 
everyone is worse off than they might have been otherwise” 
(Kollock, 1998, p. 183). An interaction in social dilemmas is 
characterised by a conflict between an individual’s desire to 
maximise personal (selfish) interests and his or her motive to 
maximise collective interests (Rapoport, 1998). Inclination to 
prioritise and maximise one's interest and advantages is seen as a 
defective self-interest choice (a dominant strategy), while 
predisposition to maximise the advantage of the collective 
interest is considered as a cooperative choice (a less preferred 
strategy). Individuals always receive a higher return, at least in 
the short run, when they act opportunistically by making a 
defecting choice. However, if all individual involved make a 
defecting decision, all will suffer in the end, and this is called 
Pareto inefficiency. This phenomenon is illustrated in the game 
theory/prisoner’s dilemma analogy. For the sake of own 
benefits, a prisoner is likely to act selfishly by defending 
themselves to get acquitted and start accusing the other 
prisoner, whether it is done deceptively (opportunistically), 
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which such choice will compromise the other individuals 
(collective interest). As such, conceptualising the social dilemma 
theory and the game theory in the commons or POS context, 
below are some examples of CPR dilemmas faced with respect 
to POS management (give-some dilemmas) and 
overconsumption (take-some dilemmas) issues, whereby the 
aforesaid prisoners can be analogous to POS users and managers 
(Ling, 2017).   
 
CPR-based POS is vulnerable to overexploitation; open-
access/public-domain POS are “classic sites for tragedy” 
(Ellickson, 1996). Ignoring resources carrying capacity and 
quality, selfish POS users may maximise their use right for their 
personal enjoyment and satisfaction or for profit generating. For 
instance, by occupying POS longer, or via the improper use of 
POS (misuse) and illegal POS conversion to commercial land 
use (Ling et al., 2016), all these consumption behaviours 
ultimately cause the spaces inaccessible and unusable by others, 
and these negative effects are a form of exclusion — whether 
temporarily or permanently. Overexploitation can also be 
exemplified in the Tragedy of the urban and neighbourhood 
commons metaphor (see Hardin, 1968). Hardin (1968) 
illustrated the consequences of overuse that can be resulted 
when rational and self-interest individuals share access and 
consumption to a common resource (POS). He further 
analogised and argued that “…freedom in commons brings ruins 
to all… Therein, lies the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a 
world that is limited”. In short, it is a circumstance where, due 
to the incomplete or ill-defined property rights of open-access 
or public domain POS, individuals are granted with 
inexhaustible use and access rights (freedom) to POS without 
any cost-effective mechanism to monitor, manage and regulate 
others' uses; thus, the rivalrous POS is doomed to 
overexploitation, ensuing in resource degradation. 
 
Besides, public domain/public realm CPR-POS is also 
susceptible to a free-riding issue, which is also a form of 
overexploitation. Paying tax to the local government for POS 
management is necessary; however, there are individuals, e.g., 
squatters and outsiders who benefit from POS facilities 
consumption do not contribute any or equivalent tax and fees. 
More vitally, they are not prohibited to use POS, subsequently 
externalising congestion and other social costs that cause other 
contributors (legal users) to unlikely contribute. The 
phenomenon is considered as shirking (or a give-some 
dilemma), where individuals are more often to under-contribute 
because they fear that others will free-ride on their 
contributions (McCarter et al., 2014; Ling et al., 2016). At the 
same time, from the local authority’s angle, who has the legal 
POS management duty, such POS is also vulnerable to shirking 
and underinvestment (give-some dilemma), due to limited 
resources (e.g., time and workforce). They (managers) may 
behave opportunistically or selfishly by neglecting the non-
pecuniary POS management maintenance and monitoring duty. 
Ultimately, such CPR-based POS which normally subjects to 
overuse may likely to face disuse and underuse issues (Miyanaga 
and Shimada, 2018). It is not surprising that, compared to 
income-generating businesses, they may deprioritise 
environmental goods and provide less maintenance for such 
non-pecuniary CPRs. 
 
Last but not least, associated with overexploitation and shirking 
issues, moral hazard is also discovered in state-owned public 
domain CPR. Since public domain POS ownership and 
management rights are both held by the local government, self-
interest POS users and residents are not incentivised to manage 
risks or care of their own defective consumption behaviour nor 
do they help monitor and watch over the improper use of POS 
by other users. As the above tasks may require some forms of 
costs (e.g., extra effort, attention and time investment), and 
most notably, the commons are not belonged to the users, 
hence they could care less of the POS condition and quality. 
 
The above POS dilemmas will be worsened and more 
pronounced if more opportunistic behaviours posed and the 
number of users (competition) escalate; they may lead to other 
dilemmas, and more negative externalities and social costs will 
ensue (e.g., vandalism, poor landscaping and cleanliness issues, 
paper park, misuse or illegal conversion of POS uses, 
congestion, conflicts among residents, dissatisfaction and 
discomfort) (McCarter et al., 2014). This situation can be 
illustrated in Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows 
theory. Their theory associates the small issues and dilemmas of 
a neighbourhood community/city with more serious co-
occurring dilemmas. For instance, the shirking of POS 
management and maintenance that cause poor cleanliness, 
landscaping and total disuse and underuse (space abandonment) 
issues may lead to severe forms of overexploitation, such as 
free-riding, which then contributes to safety and security issues 
(criminal activities, e.g., loitering and panhandling issues) and 
private physical exclusion that cause de facto inaccessible private 
spaces (Ling and Leng, 2018; Ling et al., 2016). Whether it is 
self-interested or opportunism triggered CPR POS dilemmas, 
this does not entail that CPR (resource) is always a problem per 
se; instead, it is essential to identify the factors (e.g., 
institutional design or physical characteristics) that are possible 
to cause and aggravate the present commons issues (Ostrom, 
2005; Webster, 2007). 
 
To recapitulate the above new institutional economics theories 
and concepts in the POS setting, covering the social ecological 
system, CPRs, social dilemmas, and negative externalities, and 
their interconnections (i.e., how and why CPR-based POS are 
vulnerable to POS commons dilemmas that subsequently lead to 
degraded and unsustainable POS), a graphical illustration (i.e., a 
conceptual framework) is presented below (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 A conceptual framework linking CPR-based POS with 
commons dilemmas that contribute to POS negative 
externalities 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the objective set in this study has been achieved, 
arguing that urban and neighbourhood state-owned POS is a 
type of common resources (commons), more accurately as a 
common pool resource (CPR) which possesses two inherent 
natures. POS is being rivalrous (i.e., subtractible and 
exhaustible in both POS quantity and quality aspects) and non-
excludable (i.e., being open-access to the public for access and 
consumption). The publicness and sharedness of POS can 
encompass public domain, public realm and local public goods, 
which all have various implications of the congestion levels. 
Regardless of any publicness (unexcludability) level of a CPR, as 
a result of the inherent rivalrousness and non-excludable 
attributes, as well as self-interest and opportunistic natures in a 
human behaviour, such POS is found to be subject to numerous 
commons dilemmas, including commons overexploitation and 
mismanagement (shirking) issues that result in POS negative 
externalities. Aside from offering key lessons of CPR 
conceptualisation and its implications to other commons 
settings, especially global commons (e.g., climate change and 
ocean pollution) and bridging the knowledge gap, integrating 
the social-ecological system and new institutional economics 
(i.e., commons, publicness analysis, and social dilemma 
theories) into the fields of urban and landscape planning and 
resource management, one can eventually understand better and 
have pragmatic answers why the aforementioned POS negative 
externalities pertaining to management, consumption, and 
quality issues are still occurring, despite the fact that POS has 
been spatially and architecturally well designed in the early 
planning phase. As such, the narrative synthesis of this 
concept/perspective paper may suffice to offer policy and 
management insights to policymakers (urban planners and 
landscapers), practitioners and consumers to re-think that 
common resources (POS) are truly finite, depletable and are 
having difficulties to exclude access and use of the (self-interest 
and opportunistic) public, and thus highly subject to commons 
dilemmas. Therefore, to achieve sustainable commons, effective 
governance/control in terms of POS consumption and 
consistent management is vital. For future research, a rationale 
of urban design as a necessary societal role is further proposed, 
which has established the need for proper and effective 
allocation and governance of POS via an adaptive institutional 
design (i.e., distribution of property rights and transaction 
costs). More accurately, since state-owned CPR-based POS 
governance is inefficient, this demands re-alignment of the 
property right regime to the common-property (self-organising) 
regime which is believed to be more effective in managing 
scarce resources (Ostrom, 1990; Ling et al., 2014). By doing 
the latter, it provides community club goods, which have non-
rivalrous and exclusionary properties. Club-POS can be more 
efficient and sustainable; it is less congested and provides an 
opportunity for better control and commercialisation 
(membership fees), which incentivise better management. 
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